Algorithmic Competition, Trade and Investment: The CFIUS as Privacy Regulator by Mehra, Salil K.
 
ALGORITHMIC COMPETITION, TRADE AND INVESTMENT: 
THE CFIUS AS PRIVACY REGULATOR 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past century, theories of regulation have been 
dominated by the interaction between politics and markets.  From 
eras dominated by capitalism and socialism to ones featuring 
nationalism and globalism, economists, political scientists and 
politicians have focused on how to regulate markets to improve social 
welfare, and their ideas have animated vibrant public debates.1  Until 
recent challenges from both the left and the right, the West has been 
dominated by a globalist liberalism with a presumption in favor of 
market ordering, plus limited political intervention where 
necessary—a major expression of this philosophy has been the 
adoption of policies favoring freedom of international trade and 
investment.2 
Algorithmic connectivity and competition has changed the 
terms of trade between politics and markets in a way that upsets 
current balances between regulation and markets.3  While algorithms 
have long existed, concurrent technological advances in data 
 
† Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government, Temple University, Beasley 
School of Law, Philadelphia, USA; smehra@temple.edu. 
1 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST OF 
MAN (1992) (arguing that the world had reached a historical moment in which 
these stark 20th century ideological conflicts were now over and that liberal 
democracy, market capitalism and globalism had won). 
2 Cf. Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory 
and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism, 96 Cornell 
L. Rev. 967, 969–70 (2011) (noting the ascendancy of the “Washington 
Consensus,” described as “a blueprint for the implementation of the neoclassical 
economic policies of the Chicago School: liberalization of trade, privatization of 
investment, fiscal austerity, and monetary stabilization.”). 
3 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 2–4 (2015) (describing, for example, 
the ways in which algorithms and “Big Data” have made consumers’ lives 
increasingly transparent for big business, financial institutions, and government 
agencies, but in contrast have made the workings of such organizations more 
opaque to consumers, shifting the power balance among them). 
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collection, interconnectivity, and computer processing have 
generated a new, powerful ability to connect individuals, groups, and 
firms.4  These interrelated phenomena have given rise to new forms 
of algorithmic connectivity and competition that challenge and even 
supplant the role of traditional markets in matching counterparties.5  
A few notable firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, have 
grown powerful by exploiting these developments to become 
superconnecting platforms.6  While the economic effects of matching 
buyers and sellers are already tremendous, superconnectors are also 
powerfully reshaping how civil society interacts in other areas.7  In 
addition to matching buyers and sellers, platforms also match authors 
with readers and, increasingly, partisans with like-minded comrades.8  
Still other firms, such as Uber, Airbnb, and Match.com, use 
algorithmic connectivity to link travelers, co-habitants, and seekers 
of companionship.9  Part of the power of algorithmic connectivity is 
reducing the time and transaction costs of traditional markets, while 
simultaneously increasing the search dimensions beyond price, 
quantity, and relatively coarse determinants of quality that limit 
traditional market exchange.10 
 
4 See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW 
ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 19–20 (2016) (emphasizing that 
technological change has “turbocharged” platforms that “connect potential trading 
partners residing almost anywhere in the world.”). 
5 Id. at 105 (describing how Uber’s algorithm sets its drivers’ fares, rather than 
letting drivers negotiate with passengers, the latter being a form of market-based 
pricing used for taxi and similar rides in many countries). 
6 Id. at 109–18 (explaining these firms’ commitment to an “ecosystem” business 
model designed to take advantage of network effects by robustly engaging 
multiple sides of the platform). 
7 See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA 
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 179–97 (2016) 
(describing, prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, how Facebook and others 
firms’ behavioral targeting could be used to influence voters). 
8 See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Rachel Lerman, ‘Stop the Steal’ Supporters, 
Restrained by Facebook, Turn to Parler to Peddle False Election Claims, 
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/10/facebook-parler-
election-claims/ [https://perma.cc/NZ5A-5G6F] (describing movements of 
conservative political adherents to the Parler social media platform). 
9 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 143–48 (explaining use of 
reputational scoring by platforms to match participants). 
10 See Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
649, 650 (2016) (arguing that pre-Internet privacy norms promoted marketing 
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But at the same time, the development of algorithmic 
connectivity changes the relationship between international 
investment, domestic governance, and individual privacy. 11  
Transactions in consumer data are key to consumer targeting and 
tailoring, which in turn are critical to algorithmic connectivity.12  This 
tension is increasingly expressed in the scrutiny paid to cross-border 
M&A investment involving algorithmic connectivity and consumer 
data transactions, particularly that of the CFIUS (“Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States”).  Recently, United States 
national security reviews forced divestiture by Chinese acquirers of 
Grindr (an online service for LGBTQ community members) and 
health data startup PatientsLikeMe, and also blocked a Chinese firm’s 
acquisition of the MoneyGram payment service.13  This short Article, 
prepared in connection with a symposium focusing in part on mergers 
and acquisition policy, argues that the recent burst of CFIUS action 
arises from the inherent limits of consumer sovereignty and 
contractarian approaches in dealing with consumer data privacy—
especially across the borders of nations with very different 
approaches to using the acquired data. 
II. CHINA, AND THE CFIUS, WAKES 
The CFIUS: An Origin Story 
Despite its recent emergence as a focus of mergers and 
acquisitions lawyers involved in United States-China investment, the 
CFIUS is not a recent invention.  Established in 1975 via an executive 
 
functioning by hiding “salient but distorting information such as personal or 
political commitments” that are increasingly being used to “cancel” economic 
actors).  
11 See PASQUALE, supra note 3, at 189–94 (arguing for steps to regulate the 
interaction between these interests). 
12 See O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 173 (warning that “oceans of behavioral data, in 
coming years, will feed straight into artificial intelligence systems,” which will 
target individual consumers, “[a]nd these will remain, to human eyes, black 
boxes”). 
13 Nevena Simidjiyska, CFIUS Flexes New Muscles Where Consumer Data and 
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order by President Gerald Ford, the CFIUS is a committee with 
representation from multiple executive branch departments, chaired 
by the Secretary of the Treasury and tasked with reviewing certain 
transactions involving foreign investment in the United States to 
determine their national security implications.14 
That said, the CFIUS did not always have the power and the 
relevance that it has today.  In fact, its history shows a certain level 
of ad hoc amendment that has characterized its development.  In 
response to concerns about the Japanese firm Fujitsu’s proposed 
acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor, the 1988 Exon-Florio 
Amendment gave the president the power to review and block foreign 
investments that might harm national security; President Reagan then 
delegated the review process to the CFIUS.15  Subsequently, in 2007, 
concern over the potential management of six major United States 
seaports by a U.A.E.-based firm led Congress to formalize and 
strengthen the CFIUS review process.16  
Recent CFIUS actions regarding Chinese firm investment in 
the United States have triggered fears of a “new Cold War,” at least 
in the economic sphere. 17   Similar to the Japanese and U.A.E. 
investment inspired actions, the past decade has seen significant 
 
14 See generally Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. (1975). 
15 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Exon-Florio 
Amendment), Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (amended 2006, 
2018) (giving the president the power to block foreign investments when “there is 
credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest 
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national 
security”). 
16 See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–49, 
121 Stat. 246 (formalizing the CFIUS’s membership, establishing a 45-day pre-
transaction review period, requiring a report to Congress and authorizing the 
CFIUS to require mitigation steps, such as agreed pre-transaction divestitures). 
17 See Jack Nicas, Mike Isaac & Ana Swanson, TikTok Said to Be Under National 
Security Review, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-
review.html [https://perma.cc/3BNQ-SNP4] (describing the CFIUS review of 
TikTok’s parent firm’s U.S. investment and describing it as “what some analysts 
refer to as a new Cold War”); see also Dan Primack, “New Cold War” Fears Hit 
Silicon Valley, AXIOS (May 24, 2019), https://www.axios.com/us-china-trade-
new-cold-war-9ab805a4-bd8e-4d99-9b91-0e3495a945ba.html 
[https://perma.cc/JSY8-E44N] (describing the perception among some tech firms 
that “Chinese companies are no longer viewed as viable acquirers due to concerns 
that the deals could be blocked by CFIUS”). 
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changes to the CFIUS and its application that have been driven by 
concern about rising Chinese investment in the United States.  In 
particular, inbound investment into the United States from Chinese 
sources rose from less than $5 billion annually on the eve of the 
Global Financial Crisis to over seven times as much one decade later; 
the number of deals has increased similarly. 18   The Treasury 
Department issues annual reports concerning the CFIUS’s activity, 
and the public version of the most recent report details a significant 
rise in overall CFIUS action (see Figure 1). 
 
 Figure 1.19 




Notices Withdrawn and 
Transactions Abandoned in 
Light of CFIUS-Related 
National Security Concerns 
2014 147 51 2 
2015 143 66 3 
2016 172 79 3 
2017 237 172 24 
2018 229 159 17 
 
While the absolute numbers of transactions blocked are small, 
the percentage change in a few short years is dramatic.  Moreover, 
these numbers may understate the CFIUS’s actual impact.  Notably, 
deal participants report changing their behavior due to the perception 
of an increasingly active CFIUS; that is, the numbers of transactions 
abandoned may be rising despite increasing caution regarding the 
 
18 See Monan Zhang, Investment Protectionism in the Name of National Security, 
CHINA-US FOCUS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-
economy/investment-protectionism-in-the-name-of-national-security 
[https://perma.cc/TW2U-9E7G] (citing Thomson Reuters data detailing the 
acceleration of China’s purchase of United States companies over ten years). 
19 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, CFIUS Annual Report to Congress, ¶ Table I-1 
Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions, 2010–2018, 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Summary-Data-2014-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S7PF-RQAF].  
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investments that make up the underlying deal mix that is being 
reviewed.20 
The perception that recently stiffened CFIUS review policies 
have disproportionately affected Chinese firms and investors has 
some factual support—early in the Trump Administration, a number 
of high-profile proposed acquisitions of United States firms by 
Chinese buyers were blocked. 21   In particular, several of these 
transactions were high-profile investments that attracted significant 
attention in the business press.  Among these blocked transactions 
were potential acquisitions of the Grindr LGBTQ community app, the 
MoneyGram money transfer service, and the health data startup 
PatientsLikeMe.22  The targets of each of these investments were U.S. 
firms with substantial access to sensitive consumer data. 23   But 
because the objects of these investments did not fit a traditional 
notion of national security-related infrastructure, such as ports, 
 
20 See Primack, supra note 17 (reporting the considerable impact that CFIUS 
activity has had on the deals between Silicon Valley investors and firms).  
21 See China’s Ant Financial is Obliged to Abandon an American Acquisition, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www-economist-
com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/business/2018/01/06/chinas-ant-financial-is-
obliged-to-abandon-an-american-acquisition [https://perma.cc/HA83-U83L] 
(providing an overview of several prominent Chinese attempted purchases of U.S. 
businesses that were stopped by the Trump Administration). 
22 See Harry L. Clark et al., Grindr And PatientsLikeMe Outcomes Show Non-
Cleared Transactions’ Exposure to CFIUS Scrutiny, Especially When PII Is 




(suggesting that U.S. blocking of Chinese investments in Grindr, MoneyGram and 
PatientsLikeMe can be explained by the desire to protect Americans’ privacy 
interest in their personally identifiable information). 
23 See Simidjiyska, supra note 13 (stating that “[t]he Grindr and PatientsLikeMe 
decisions strongly suggest that the [CFIUS] overseers are very concerned about 
Chinese investment, particularly where sensitive personal data is involved” even 
though these potential transactions predated the FIRRMA of 2018’s effective 
date); Louise Lucas, Don Weinland & Shawn Donnan, Data Take Centre Stage as 
Ant Financial Fails in MoneyGram Bid, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/fd22dd9c-f06d-11e7-b220-857e26d1aca4 
[https://perma.cc/G88G-VGZB] (quoting an anonymous banker “with knowledge 
of the MoneyGram deal say[ing] its demise was a ‘strong precedent for anything 
involving personal data,’ extending national security concerns to a much broader 
number of sectors”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/2
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aviation or defense-related electronics, their rejection by the CFIUS 
was seen as unprecedented to observers. 24   In retrospect, CFIUS 
opposition to these Chinese investments reveals a shifting 
understanding of what constitutes national security. 
A CFIUS Reboot 
Reflecting a changing conception of national security 
concerns, Congress recently passed legislation aimed at bringing the 
CFIUS’s process and substance up to date; that legislation was 
notably passed during the uptick in serious review of China-related 
transactions.25  The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization 
Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”) changed CFIUS review in several ways, 
formalizing the process, clarifying certain safe harbor countries and 
defining industries and types of transactions that are likely to attract 
strong concern.26 
Procedurally, the FIRRMA transforms the CFIUS process 
into a formal notification regime, similar in some ways to the Hart-
Scott-Rodino process for antitrust clearance. 27   Previously, the 
CFIUS had a voluntary filing regime whereby a foreign investor 
could choose whether to notify the CFIUS of its transaction before 
closing.28  That said, prior to the FIRRMA, the CFIUS could review 
a transaction even in the absence of notification.29  The FIRRMA 
makes formal notification mandatory; a foreign investor must submit 
 
24 See Morrison & Foerster, CFIUS Means Business, Uniwinding Non-Notified 
Transactions and Penalizing Non-Compliance with Mitigation Agreements, JD 
SUPRA (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfius-means-
business-unwinding-non-86555/ [https://perma.cc/Z8WH-W7JN] (listing the 
Grindr and PatientsLikeMe acquisitions, in particular, among several 
unprecedented CFIUS developments).  
25 See e.g., Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115–232, §1701–93, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174 (2018) [hereinafter FIRRMA] 
(aiming to change CFIUS processes to reflect the modern economic 
environment). 
26 Id. 
27 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2016).  Like the 
FIRRMA, it sets forth a positive duty for investors to notify the government of a 
covered transaction, as well as a time schedule for the review process. 
28 F.T.C. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 
2004 (2004). 
29 See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 24 (pointing out that the CFIUS had 
“unwind[ed] non-notified transactions”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
2020] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 15 
 
a declaration to the CFIUS at least 45 days before closing on any 
transaction in which the foreign investor would acquire control of a 
company that develops “critical technologies”—or by which the 
foreign investor could gain “material non-public access” to those 
technologies.” 30   Significantly, it also authorizes the Treasury 
Department to create and maintain lists of “excepted investors” from 
specific “excepted foreign states,” such as United States treaty allies, 
that would potentially be exempt from the CFIUS process.31 
The FIRRMA’s changes to the substantive scope of CFIUS 
review will likely create increased tension with Chinese investors—
though the source of that tension lies not simply in anti-China 
sentiment, but in the changing nature of what is considered sensitive 
in terms of national security.  The key FIRRMA changes involve both 
the degree of control triggering concern, as well as the specific 
industries and technologies at issue.  First, before FIRRMA, the 
CFIUS could only block transactions that would result in foreign 
control of a United States business.32  Under the prior understanding, 
“control” in practice meant the ability to sell the company, enter or 
 
30 Id. 
31 Notably, the Department of the Treasury has issued somewhat contradictory 
language regarding the strength of any potential safe harbor.  See U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON FINAL CFIUS REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING FIRRMA (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Final-FIRRMA-Regulations-FAQs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6AGH-YVHY] (noting that while identifying Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom as the “initial excepted foreign states,” Treasury has also 
stated that “[n]ot necessarily” “will every foreign person based in an ‘excepted 
foreign state’ . . .  qualify as an ‘excepted investor,’” and even if so qualified, the 
“CFIUS retains the authority to review a transaction that could result in foreign 
control of any U.S. business, regardless of whether the foreign person is an 
‘excepted investor’”); see also supra note 28, at 5 (providing CFIUS with review 
authority over transactions).  
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 31, at 2 (stating that FIRRMA 
updated and strengthened CFIUS processes).  See also Joseph V. Moreno et al., 
CFIUS Unbound: Foreign Investor Deals Continue to Draw Intense National 
Security Scrutiny, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cfius-unbound-foreign-investor-deals-
continue-to-draw-intense-national-security [https://perma.cc/8HPU-4PPT] (noting 
that “Prior to FIRRMA, a “covered transaction” subject to CFIUS review was 
limited to mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers by or with a foreign person that 
could result in foreign “control” of any person engaged in interstate commerce in 
the United States, and that could threaten the national security of the United 
States”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/2
16 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 16 
 
leave contracts, close production facilities, and the like. 33   The 
FIRRMA expands that jurisdiction to permit review of transactions 
which give a foreign investor even just a noncontrolling stake in 
certain industries, recognizing that even sub-majority ownership can 
confer access and influence.34 
Additionally, the FIRRMA broadens the range of industries 
that attract review.  CFIUS review expands to cover foreign 
investment in U.S. companies involved with critical technologies and, 
crucially, the sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens.  The FIRRMA 
also includes a new focus on “material nonpublic technical 
information.”35  Moreover, the FIRRMA authorizes the Department 
of the Treasury to identify pilot industries of particular concern.  
Alongside traditional national security-related concerns such as 
aerospace and oceangoing vessel production, the initial named 
industries included computers, semiconductors, wireless 
communications, and electronic storage.36 
The FIRRMA and its implementing regulations, by 
standardizing the CFIUS process, create increased certainty for 
foreign investors and their US counterparties regarding the CFIUS 
process.  However, that increased certainty will not necessarily 
diffuse trade tensions, particularly with China.  In particular, the 
focus industries that the Department of the Treasury has identified 
pursuant to its FIRRMA authority include a number of areas that are 
also priority industries under the “Made in China 2025” industrial 
policy pursued by China’s central government; these areas include 
such key industries as electrical equipment, materials science, 




35 Id.  See also Jeffrey Richardson, CFIUS Review Authority Expands, JD SUPRA 
(Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfius-review-authority-
expands-62714/ [https://perma.cc/5LUX-PRJP]. 
36 See Treasury Releases Interim Regulations for FIRRMA Pilot Program, U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY (Oct. 10, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/sm506 [https://perma.cc/Y9V4-9ML5] (introducing the new regulations’ 
scope, purpose, and basic contents); see also CFIUS Laws and Guidance, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF TREASURY (Feb. 13, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-
cfius/cfius-legislation [https://perma.cc/K7DF-TETW] (releasing final CFIUS 
regulations).   
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information and communications technology. 37   However, any 
attempt to deal with this tension runs into an ambiguity that serves as 
a kind of roadblock: the United States’ own current lack of concrete 
policies outlining its citizens’ fundamental interests regarding 
information technology, including data privacy. 
III. CURRENT U.S. LAW: DATA PRIVACY LIKE NO ONE’S 
WATCHING 
What is generating the CFIUS’ tension with Chinese 
investment in U.S. information technology is a two-part question that 
goes beyond foreign investment:  to what extent does United States 
citizens’ data privacy matter, and what legal steps should be taken to 
address that concern?  Both parts of that question are the subject of 
intense current discussion, and both parts are critical to why the 
CFIUS has become increasingly active. 
Data Privacy—What, Why and How Much? 
Whether U.S. citizens should enjoy data privacy, and if so, 
how much, is a leading question of the early twenty-first century.  
Much as the development of portable, snapshot-capable film cameras 
catalyzed Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ 1890 landmark article 
The Right to Privacy, 38  the increasing ability of firms and 
 
37 See generally China to Invest Big in “Made in China 2025 Strategy,” XINHUA 
NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/10/12/content_28147590
4600274.htm [https://perma.cc/LS7R-SVLQ] (introducing China’s “Made in 
China 2025 Strategy”); see also Martijn Rasser, The United States Needs a 
Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 24, 2019), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/24/national-artificial-intelligence-strategy-
united-states-fall-behind-china/ [https://perma.cc/X7AS-KRVY] (contrasting 
relatively laissez-faire United States policy concerning its “technological edge” 
with the “Made in China 2025 initiative—a wide-ranking industrial policy 
intended to vault China into the select club of global technology powers”); James 
McBride & Andrew Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global 
Trade?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 13, 2019) 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade 
[https://perma.cc/9BHR-7DBC] (listing 12 targeted sectors thought to be critical 
and technologically advanced). 
38 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/2
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governments to capture, store and process all manner of individuals’ 
information has driven a movement to bolster data privacy.  Much as 
with better cameras, better and more portable computing power has 
driven shifts in how people live that has come with both benefits, such 
as increased productivity and convenience, as well as costs in terms 
of personal privacy. 
That said, whether data privacy should be protected is still not 
a matter of consensus.  As the COVID-19 crisis has revealed, some 
doubt that privacy needs protecting. 39   However, well before the 
pandemic, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg argued that privacy 
was no longer a “social norm,” and so did not need protecting.40  
Similarly, about a decade ago, Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt 
had gone on record to question the need for data privacy, stating that 
“if you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe 
you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.”41 
While the antagonistic view of major tech titans may have 
slowed the growth of interest in citizens’ data privacy in the United 
States, it did not stop it.  Survey data comparing citizens’ concerns at 
the start of the twenty-first century and again in 2010 showed that 
individuals had become increasingly concerned with companies 
tracking their behavior online and then making the acquired data an 
object of commerce.42  Technological change has forced regulators 
such as the FTC to become involved in protecting citizens’ 
 
39 See Roy Cellan-Jones, Coronavirus: Privacy in a Pandemic, BBC (Apr. 4, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52135916 [https://perma.cc/ZCR2-
FQ6X] (quoting a Tweet concerning privacy concerns regarding COVID-19 
tracking via smartphone, the former Portuguese Minister for Europe stating: “I am 
more and more convinced the greatest battle of our time is against the ‘religion of 
privacy.’ It literally could get us all killed.”); @MacaesBruno, TWITTER (Mar. 31, 
2020, 9:12 PM), https://twitter.com/MacaesBruno/status/1245157022816968704. 
40 Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/4PEY-QR4B]. 
41 Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy is Dead on Facebook. Get Over It, NBC NEWS 
(Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34825225/ns/technology_and_science-
tech_and_gadgets/t/privacy-dead-facebook-get-over-it/#.XoeJW257mF0 
[https://perma.cc/VBB2-UKNP].   
42 See Annie I. Anton et al., How Internet Users Privacy Concerns Have Evolved 
Since 2002, 8 IEEE SEC & PRIV. MAG., 21 (2010) (reporting changes over time in 
systematic survey responses regarding consumer concerns).   
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longstanding interest in their privacy, and lawyers, academic 
commentators and policymakers have become increasingly active, at 
least in specific sectors such as health and financial information 
privacy.43 
Despite citizens’ interest in their privacy in a technologically 
shifting world, the United States continues to lack any general 
national privacy legislation – in contrast to the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).44  Does this mean that 
Americans value their privacy less than Europeans?  Not necessarily, 
of course; the reality is that comparative difficulties in working 
through the political process could also explain the lack of a United 
States analogue to the GDPR.45  Whatever the reason, the lack of 
general data privacy law in the U.S. leaves the protection of consumer 
information online largely to private ordering. 
Foreign Investment in Data and the CFIUS as Placeholder 
Without general privacy regulation, United States consumers’ 
online data is largely governed by private contracting, supplemented 
with reputational enforcement.46  Doubts have arisen concerning the 
 
43See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, reprinted in 
PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 37–53 (Kristen J. Mathews, Proskauer Rose LLP eds., 2d ed. 
2016) (outlining history of information privacy, including new targeted sectoral 
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(HIPAA) and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) 
enacted after the growth of the consumer-facing Internet).   
44 See generally DIRK AUER & GEOFFREY A. MANNE, IS EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
LAW PROTECTIONIST? (Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. eds., 2019), 
https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Is-European-Competition-
Law-Protectionist-Issue-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9U6-NRS7] (pointing out 
this divergence in privacy policy, while noting that California did enact a state-
level general privacy law in 2018). 
45 See Müge Fazlioglu, Tracking the Politics of US Privacy Legislation, IAPP 
(Dec. 13, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/tracking-the-politics-of-federal-us-
privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/4ME8-XK23] (suggesting that the U.S.’ 
inability to adopt national privacy protection as the EU has with the GDPR 
reflects not only a lack of interest in protecting privacy, but further exposes the 
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viability of a consumer sovereignty-based market solution to privacy 
issues—it has become increasingly questionable whether consumers 
can truly contract for their online privacy given asymmetries of 
information and market power.47 
Moreover, the contractarian rationale has failed in actual 
application to protect consumers over the course of these transactions.  
Specifically, while first-generation privacy scholarship predicted that 
contract law would play a role in enforcing breaches of privacy 
policies, courts have often concluded that privacy policies are 
“general statements of policy rather than enforceable contracts.”48  
Additionally, network effects may prevent consumer choice from 
being a shield against privacy harms.49  In concrete terms, when one 
has only weak competitive alternatives due to the choices of others 
(e.g., join Facebook versus an alternative social networking service 
that lacks one’s friends and family), one’s choices will not necessarily 
resemble the Economics 101 product of voluntary actions in an 
efficient market.  Finally, behavioral economics has revealed some 
weaknesses in the consumer-sovereignty/contractarian approach to 
transactions in consumer data.50  For example, studies of bounded 
attention demonstrate that if users are distracted for even a couple of 
seconds after being given a privacy policy, they significantly lower 
their risk perceptions and become more amenable to consent; 
moreover, consistent with other findings from behavioral law and 
economics, consumers cannot easily value long-term risks associated 
with the disclosure of personal information.51 
This United States’ privacy regulation gap has drawn concern 
from commentators and policymakers.  Some worry about the 
increasing power of data-rich monopolistic platforms to implement a 
 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 181, 187 (2016) (explaining why, without legal 
requirement, “nearly all companies [in the United States] have a privacy policy”).   
47 See John Mark Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 149 (2015) (describing these arguments and critiquing them).  
48Norton, supra note 46, at 190. 
49See id. at 202–203 (concluding that the trend in case law renders privacy policy 
breaches effectively “categorically immune” from consumers’ privately brought 
breach of contract claims). 
50 See Yoan Hermstrüwer, Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law 
and Economics of Consent and Big Data, 8 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & 
ELECTRONIC COM. L. 9, 16 (2017) (stating that consumers, even when partially 
protected, may create market inefficiencies that erode their privacy rights). 
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“market-driven coup from above” via “surveillance capitalism.”52  
Others question whether the United States’ approach positions the 
nation well in a global race to develop critical artificial intelligence 
capabilities.53  Finally, more practical concerns about cybersecurity 
and the vulnerability of networked infrastructure—as highlighted by 
the 2017 NotPetya attacks—have raised alarm concerning 
unprotected data.54 
The lack of general legal protections for data privacy goes 
beyond foreign investment transactions.  However, the recent draft 
implementing regulations of the FIRRMA specifically make 
transactions giving access to U.S. citizens’ “sensitive personal data” 
a focus of CFIUS review.55  Viewed through the lens of the general 
ambiguity concerning the current use of personal data, CFIUS review 
can be seen as a placeholder or pause button.  Lacking a consensus 
about how to regulate and protect data privacy, the CFIUS is arguably 
trying to minimize the data privacy harm to avoid having to 
unscramble the eggs later.  Because current privacy protections are 
based on difficult-to-enforce consumer contracts, acquisition of 
United States consumer data by Chinese firms, and especially 
Chinese government-related or -controlled firms, potentially involves 
harms that are not addressable via the current underdetermined 
approach.56  The CFIUS’ activity concerning data privacy responds 
to general legal and policy inaction. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: BEYOND DATA PRIVACY TO 
INFORMATION AND NARRATIVE CONTROL 
While data privacy is part of the national security dilemma, it 
may be more a start than an endpoint.  Concerns about the foreign 
control of new information and communications technology may go 
beyond issues of blackmail, as may have been the case with the 
CFIUS’ intervention in the acquisitions of Grindr and MoneyGram.  
As a result, the CFIUS may face pressure to act vis-à-vis new gaps in 
dealing with consumers and information platforms. 
For example, at the start of 2020, a transaction under CFIUS 
scrutiny exemplified this shift:  the Chinese firm ByteDance’s 
acquisition of the United States-based social media app Musical.ly, 
which brought with it the basis for the wildly popular TikTok video 
sharing platform.57  The concern with TikTok, particularly popular 
with users 16 to 24, may not simply be that it has access to their 
sensitive private information; it may also be the possibility that the 
platform could be used to spread disinformation or manipulate 
voters.58  In August 2020, President Trump issued an executive order 
that would prohibit U.S. individuals and firms from engaging in any 
transactions with TikTok.59  While the order cited TikTok’s capturing 
“Americans’ personal and proprietary information,”60 voices in the 
media have observed that Trump’s public concern with TikTok 
appeared to follow its use by a social media campaign that tampered 
with attendance at one of his pre-election rallies.61 
 
57 See David R. Hanke, TikTok National Security Problem: Don’t Ignore the 
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election). 
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Given concerns about the manipulation of the 2016 United 
States national election, the review of the TikTok-related investment 
may be warranted.62  But this represents a different concern than 
consumer data privacy—instead, the worry is about the manipulation 
of information and the control of political narratives.  The intersection 
of so-called fake news and the political process is a problem that goes 
beyond an interagency committee like the CFIUS and arguably 
involves questions about epistemology and the nature of democratic 
governance.  The CFIUS alone cannot answer such questions; but it 
surely can be pressed into action while the United States government, 
media, and civil society engage with this question and other yet-
unknown data- and information-related questions that will arise.  Is 
this, as it has been accused of being, protectionism?  Not in the way 
we have previously understood that word, as in the service of national 
mercantile gain.  Instead, it is, at least in part, an attempt to shield 
noneconomic values such as privacy, liberty and even less obvious 
ones that are difficult to define and measure, but vital nonetheless.  
“You don’t know what you’ve got ‘til it’s gone.’”63 
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